" “Sir (addressing Saddam Hussain), we will accomplish the mission by 1990”.
That is the potent promise that was offered on April 1985 by some of the top executives in the Iraqi National Nuclear Program (INNP) to the late Saddam Hussain in a meeting that was held in a mobile caravan in Al-Radwanya, a heavily fortified site near Baghdad international airport.
The meeting was exclusively attended by Saddam Hussain, his deputy, his personal secretary and the five commissioners (members of the executive committee) of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).
Did that loaded promise impact the thinking and planning of Saddam Hussain that would eventually lead him to invade Kuwait?
This book sheds light on the most important milestones, some of them revealed here for the first time, during the ten years’ progress, from 1981-1991, of the Iraqi National Nuclear Program, a covert and thorough Iraqi nuclear program that focused initially on several processes for uranium enrichment and then later turned to military objectives before its demise and destruction in 1991. Notably, this book sets the records straight in an unequivocal manner.
The defining moment for the program came exactly two years later, in April 1987, when the same members of the executive committee of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission who had made the solemn promise to Saddam Hussain now admitted to the rest of the members of the executive committee of the IAEC that the promised target date would not be met. This information is believed to have not been transmitted to Saddam Hussain at all. However, the consequences of the failure to fulfill the promise given on 1985 morphed the Iraqi National Nuclear Program into high gear, streamlined its administrative and research processes and led to the industrial scale adoption of the same enrichment process that was previously adopted in the American Manhattan Project in World War II.
This book also strives to put the program’s record straight as it is recounted by participants who were in various leading positions in it as well as inputs and edits from other senior colleagues. It aims to debunk misleading accounts in two previously published books on this subject; i.e.“Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda” published in 2000, which provided foreign intelligence laden misinformation for the pretext for the invasion of Iraq, and “The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind” written in 2004, which overtly and grossly overstated the role of its author in the program and was written to repay the debt of the authors’ relocation to the U.S. by the CIA after the invasion of Iraq in 2003." .